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ABSTRACT
A unified modeling framework for non-functional properties of a
program is essential for research in software analysis and verifi-
cation, since it reduces burdens on individual researchers to im-
plement new approaches and compare existing approaches. We
present CANAL, a framework that models the cache behaviors of
a program by transforming its intermediate representation in the
LLVM compiler. CANAL inserts auxiliary variables and instructions
over these variables, to allow standard verification tools to handle
a new class of cache related properties, e.g., for computing the
worst-case execution time and detecting side-channel leaks. We
demonstrate the effectiveness of CANAL using three verification
tools: KLEE, SMACK and Crab-llvm. We confirm the accuracy of
our cache model by comparing with CPU cycle-accurate simulation
results of GEM5. CANAL is available on GitHub1 and YouTube2.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Software and its engineering → Software verification and
validation; • Security andprivacy→Cryptanalysis and other
attacks;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Analyzing the cache behaviors of a program is important, e.g., for
computing the worst-case execution time of a real-time system [5,
13] and detecting information leaks through side channels [8, 15].
However, existing verification tools are often designed only for
checking functional properties, e.g., assertions or pre- and post-
conditions. For example, none of the participants of recent software
verification competitions [2] can verify non-functional properties
such as those related to the execution time. Although specialized
tools have been developed to handle such non-functional properties,
they are rarely open-source or as well-maintained as mainstream
verification tools. As a result, it is difficult for individual researchers
to implement new approaches for verifying such properties or
evaluate existing approaches.
We fill the gap by developing a lightweight cachemodeling frame-
work for standard verification tools, by transforming the LLVM
intermediate representation (IR) of a program to add self-modeling
capabilities. That is, we insert auxiliary variables and LLVM in-
structions over these variables to record and update cache statistics
related to Load/Store instructions during the program execution.
1Tool and benchmarks: https://github.com/canalcache/canal
2Demo video: https://youtu.be/JDou3F1j2nY
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Figure 1: The overall flow of CANAL.
By using the instrumented LLVM bitcode as input, standard (func-
tional) verification tools will have the capability of verifying a new
class of (non-functional) properties.
Our modeling framework, named CANAL, takes C/C++ code as
input and emits LLVM bitcode as output. Thus, it can be used by any
LLVM-based verification tools. For example, symbolic execution
tools such as KLEE [4] may take the program instrumented by
CANAL to detect side-channel leaks; bounded model checkers such
as SMACK [14] may take the program instrumented by CANAL to
conductMust- andMay-hit cache analyses; and static analyzers
based on numerical abstract interpretation, such as Crab-llvm [10],
may take the program instrumented by CANAL to conduct worst-
case execution time (WCET) analysis.
In the remainder of this paper, we shall explain how to combine
CANAL with KLEE, SMACK and Crab-llvm to obtain the desired
results. We also compareCANALwith the CPU cycle-accurate simu-
lation results of GEM5 [9], a standard micro-architectural simulator,
to demonstrate the accuracy of our cache model.
2 TOOL OVERVIEW
Figure 1 shows the overall flow of CANAL, which takes the C/C++
code of a program and the cache configuration file of a target
computer as input, and returns the instrumented LLVM bitcode as
output. After compiling the C/C++ code into LLVM bitcode, it uses
a sequence of optimization (opt) passes to insert, before or after
each Load/Store instruction, some new instructions that model the
change of cache states due to these memory accesses. The inserted
instructions can be understood as invocations of two functions:
__CSIM_Load(addrInfo) and __CSIM_Store(addrInfo), which
updates our model of the cache state whenever Load or Store is
executed; addrInfo denotes information of the memory location.
In addition to the automatically inserted calls to __CSIM_Load
and __CSIM_Store, the user of CANAL may specify properties us-
ing these auxiliary variables: __CSIM_num_hit, __CSIM_num_miss,
__CSIM_Load_ret, and __CSIM_Store_ret. They represent the ac-
cumulative numbers of hits and misses along a program path, as
well as the cache status (hit or miss) associated with each mem-
ory access. By feeding the instrumented LLVM bitcode to standard
verification tools as input, CANAL allows them to verify a new
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class of non-functional properties, such as assertions over auxiliary
variables that model the cache behaviors of the program.
int main() {
__CSIM_init_cache();
char out[16];
aes_encrypt("hello world!", out);
__CSIM_print_stat();
}
Figure 2: CANAL as stan-
dalone cache simulator.
Accuracy. To demonstrate
the accuracy of our cache
model, we compare our results
with the cache statistics re-
ported by GEM5. Toward this
end, note that CANAL may
be used as a standalone cache
simulator: if we compile the
LLVM bitcode instrumented by CANAL to an executable and run it
with a concrete input, it will produce the cache statistics associated
with that particular execution. Figure 2 shows this usage case, where
__CSIM_init_cache() and __CSIM_print_stat() are inserted to
the original C program to initialize the cache states and display the
result, respectively. The function body of aes_encrypt() will be
instrumented by CANAL automatically.
Since the cache statistics reported by GEM5 include not only the
main() function but also operating system code executed before
and after, we need to create two program versions and then com-
pute their difference. One of the programs consists of the main()
function and instructions inserted at the beginning and end of
the main() function to flush the cache, while the other program
consists of only these cache-flushing instructions with an empty
main() function body. By running these two programs and com-
puting the difference, we have obtained the exact numbers of cache
hits and misses reported by GEM5.
Table 1 shows the comparison of GEM5 and CANAL for five
example programs, including three sorting routines and two cryp-
tographic routines. The results are always identical. The sorting
routines exhibit a diverse range of memory-accessing behavior
based on input data (array of random integers). The cryptographic
routines have security-critical computations that are often target
of side-channel attacks; their inputs are an encrypted message of
“hello world!” using a predefined encryption key. To ensure that we
trigger a rich set of cache behaviors during the experiments, we
configured the cache to be 4-way associativity with LRU replace-
ment policy, 64-byte line size, and 1K-byte cache size. With a larger
cache size, the simulation speed of CANAL will not change much
but there will be fewer cache conflicts.
Table 1: Accuracy comparison: CANAL versus GEM5
GEM5 CANAL
Name LoC Mem.access R.Miss W.Miss Time(s) R.Miss W.Miss Time(s)
Ary Acc 70 322,575 2,881 0 0.62 2,881 0 5.30
Bub.Sort 49 11,028,902 66,560 865 13.53 66,560 865 0.32
Ins.Sort 49 2,619,985 15,054 68 2.98 15,054 68 0.39
AES [1] 789 534 171 39 0.28 171 39 1.43
DES [1] 368 580 108 11 0.29 108 11 0.17
3 APPLICATION SCENARIOS
We now demonstrate how CANAL may be used by KLEE, SMACK,
and Crab-llvm using five example programs taken from the SV-
COMP benchmark [2]: copysome, sanfoundry, and standard from
the array-programs section, and gcd and sum from the bit-vectors
section. We use a 4-way associative cache with LRU and 64-byte
cache line while setting the cache size to 1 KB, 16 KB and 32 KB,
respectively. We set the timeout to one hour for each program.
3.1 Combined with Symbolic Execution Tools
Symbolic execution is a technique for systematically exploring fea-
sible paths of a program and generating their test inputs. Although
it has been used primarily for checking functional properties, with
CANAL, it can now be used to detect timing side-channel leaks.
Timing Side-channel Leaks. We say that a program P(k) with
sensitive input k has timing side-channel leaks if the execution
time of P depends on the value of k . That is, ∃k1,k2 ∈ dom(k) :
τ (P ,k1) , τ (P ,k2), where k1 and k2 are values in the domain of
k and τ is the execution time. Even if the program executes the
same number (and type) of instructions, the execution time may
still differ if there are different numbers of cache hits/misses. Such
side-channel leaks may be detected by CANAL + KLEE.
klee_make_symbolic(&input1);
klee_make_symbolic(&input2);
__CSIM_init_cache();
prog(input1);
h1 = __CSIM_num_hit;
m1 = __CSIM_num_miss;
__CSIM_init_cache();
prog(input2);
h2 = __CSIM_num_hit;
m2 = __CSIM_num_miss;
assert( h1==h2 && m1==m2 );
Figure 3: CANAL for tim-
ing side channel detection.
Figure 3 shows an exam-
ple, where input1 and input2
are marked as symbolic values
and used to run the program
prog() twice. After each ex-
ecution, the numbers of hits
and misses are stored in h1,
m1, h2, and m2, respectively.
Finally, the assertion checks
if prog() is leak-free; that is,
∀ input1,input2, the condi-
tion (h1==h2 && m1==m2) al-
ways holds. KLEE can be used to search for concrete values of
input1 and input2 that violate the assertion.
Table 2 shows the results of running KLEE on these programs.
In each case, we manually modified the program to mark one or
more parameters as the sensitive input. Columns 3-5 show if a leak
is detected, together with the total number of tests generated and,
among them, the number tests that manifest the leak. Columns 6-8
show the time taken by KLEE for the different cache sizes.
Table 2: Results of the side-channel leak detection.
CANAL + KLEE Time (s)
Name LoC Detection result Total-tests Leaky-tests 1 KB 16 KB 32 KB
copysome 79 No leak 121 0 1.38 5.05 13.19
sanfoundry 95 No leak 81 0 1.32 2.16 2.82
standard 61 Leak 9 1 0.27 0.69 1.10
gcd 52 Leak 6 1 0.11 0.41 0.77
sum 56 Leak 6 1 0.07 0.38 0.74
3.2 Combined with Software Verification Tools
While symbolic execution is geared toward generating tests, verifi-
cation tools such as SMACK are geared toward generating proofs,
e.g., proving that an assertion holds under all test inputs. We show
how SMACK can leverageCANAL to prove cache related properties.
Must-hits and Must-misses. One type of properties of interest
is assertions over auxiliary variables such as __CSIM_Load_ret
and __CSIM_Store_ret. For example, if a certain Load or Store
instruction in the program always leads to a cache hit or miss,
regardless of the program path and test input; in such a case, we
call it a Must-hit or a Must-miss.
CANAL instrument the LLVM bit-code in such a way that calls
to __CSIM_Load() and __CSIM_Store() set the values of auxiliary
variables __CSIM_Load_ret and __CSIM_Store_ret to reflect the
cache status: true means the memory access leads to a hit, whereas
false means it leads to a miss.
2
CANAL: A Cache Timing Analysis Framework via LLVM Transformation , ,
Figure 4 shows a program where we check if read of buffer[2]
is a Must-hit. Thus, we save the value of __CSIM_Load_ret imme-
diately after the read of buffer[2] to the variable named h and
add an assertion stating h should always be true. If SMACK can
prove the assertion, we know the read of buffer[2] is a Must-hit.
Alternatively, we can add assert(h==false) and use SMACK to
prove it is a Must-miss.
Since program verification is undecided in general (e.g., equiv-
alent to the Turing-halting problem), SMACK may fail to prove
either assertion; in such a case, the result remains inconclusive. In
this particular example, however, SMACK is able to find a violation
of the Must-hit assertion and generate a counterexample. The coun-
terexample shows a scenario where buffer[0] and buffer[16]
resides in two different 64-byte cache lines.
if (cond) buffer[0] = x;
else buffer[16] = y;
z = buffer[2];
h = __CSIM_Load_ret;
assert(h == true); // `Must-Hit'?
Figure 4: CANAL for must-
hit analysis.
Table 3 shows the results
of applying CANAL+SMACK
to assertions we manually in-
serted to check if a Load
or Store instruction in the
program is a Must-hit/miss.
With loop-unrolling bound of
SMACK set to 10, and the
cache size set to 1 KB, SMACK successfully verified all assertions.
However, when the cache size was increased to 16 KB and 32 KB,
SMACK started to timeout on some programs. This points out a
scalability limitation of SMACK, together with direction for future
work: improving the verification algorithms to make SMACK (and
similar tools) more scalable for non-functional properties.
Table 3: Results of the Must-hit analysis.
CANAL + SMACK Time (s)
Name LoC Loop-unroll-bound Property Results 1 KB 16 KB 32 KB
copysome 69 10 Must-miss Verified 226.87 TO TO
sanfoundry 75 10 Must-miss Verified 78.08 1055.55 TO
standard 38 10 Must-hit Verified 24.53 139.59 344.71
gcd 74 10 Must-miss Verified 22.88 142.78 375.27
sum 42 10 Must-miss Verified 36.53 257.68 723.21
3.3 Combined with Static Analysis Tools
Static analyzers based on numerical abstract interpretation [7], such
as Crab-llvm, can generate program invariants. These invariants,
computed for each program location, are summaries over all paths
and input values. Therefore, they can be used to estimate the worst-
case execution time of a program. More specifically, by leveraging
CANAL, tools such as Crab-llvm can generate invariants in terms
of auxiliary variables such as (5 ≤ __CSIM_num_Load_hit ≤ 18).
if (cond) buffer[0] = 1;
else buffer[16] = 1;
buffer[5] = 1;
n_s_h = __CSIM_num_Store_hit;
n_s_m = __CSIM_num_Store_miss;
n_s = n_s_h + n_s_m;
__CRAB_assert(n_s_h > 1);
__CRAB_assert(n_s_m < 3);
__CRAB_assert(n_s == 2);
Figure 5: CANAL for com-
puting value ranges.
Figure 5 shows an if-else
statement controlled by the
value of cond. Assume each
cache line contains 64 bytes,
the first 16 integers of the ar-
ray fall into one cache line,
whereas the next 16 integers
starting with buffer[16] fall
into another cache line. How-
ever, during static analysis,
there is no way of knowing what the value of cond is; therefore,
one has to assume both branches may be taken.
When the Then-branch is taken, buffer[5] will be loaded to
the cache, which means the access to buffer[5] is a cache hit.
However, when the Else-branch is taken, buffer[5] will not be
loaded to the cache, which means the access to buffer[5] is a
cache miss. By using numerical abstract interpretation, Crab-llvm
can take both cases into consideration and compute value ranges
of n_s, n_s_h and n_s_m. For this example, in particular, the value
ranges would be [2,2] for n_s, [0,1] for n_s_h, and [1,2] for n_s_m.
Therefore, Crab-llvm can prove the second and the third assertions,
while reporting a potential violation of the first assertion.
In addition, an interesting application of the value ranges com-
puted by numerical abstract interpretation is to compute the worst-
case execution time (WCET), which depends on the maximum
number of cache misses along all program paths.
Table 4: Results of the numerical abstract interpretation.
CANAL + Crab-llvm Time (s)
Name LoC S.Hit S.Miss L.Hit L.Miss 1 KB 16 KB 32 KB
copysome 75 [1,∞] [2,∞] [1,∞] [0,∞] 73.77 937.23 TO
sanfoundry 85 [0,∞] [3,∞] [4,∞] [1,∞] 67.17 636.89 2416.82
standard 58 [0,∞] [1,∞] [1,∞] [0, 0] 13.06 528.53 2188.98
gcd 82 [0,∞] [2,∞] [6,∞] [0,∞] 3.99 105.59 382.53
sum 54 [0,∞] [3, 3] [2,∞] [0, 0] 0.87 39.03 146.01
copysome-unroll 105 [22, 22] [4, 4] [43, 43] [0, 0] 91.62 452.34 1303.80
sanfoundry-unroll 168 [5, 15] [3, 3] [14, 29] [1, 5] 19.04 296.64 1149.54
standard-unroll 130 [10, 19] [2, 11] [20, 20] [0, 0] 21.11 279.30 985.24
gcd-unroll 107 [0, 13] [2, 3] [6, 27] [0, 0] 11.69 174.16 608.06
sum-unroll 123 [6, 12] [3, 3] [20, 32] [0, 0] 12.51 197.88 688.32
Table 4 shows the results of applying CANAL+Crab-llvm on the
example programs. Columns 3-6 report the value ranges of the total
number Store-hits (S.Hit), Store-misses (S.Miss), Load-hits (L.Hit)
and Load-misses (L.Miss). Since these programs have loops and
Crab-llvm uses aggressive over-approximation to force termination
over loops, most of the upper bounds become +∞. Luckily, these
are fixed-bound loops, and after we automatically unrolled these
loops, Crab-llvm obtained more accurate value ranges.
4 CACHE MODELING
We now briefly explain how cache is modeled inside CANAL. It
is a lightweight cache model in that the modeling instructions are
carefully designed to reduce the overhead of the verification tools.
For example, pointers are difficult to handle by verification tools;
therefore, we avoid using them in the instrumented code.
4.1 Pre-computing Address-to-Cache Mapping
Inside LLVM, we first obtain the memory address of each program
variable by analyzing the symbol table of the pre-compiled code.
Then, for the target computer architecture, we generate a memory
layout. We try to pre-compute the possible address value for each
load or store instruction in the program. If the address is a fixed
value, we compute its set and tag fields in the cache, and use these
concrete values to simplify the instantiation of __CSIM_Load()
and __CSIM_Store(). Otherwise, we resort to the use of if-else
statements to dynamically compute the set and tag fields (more
difficult to handle by verification tools).
int var;//its cache `set' and `tag'
are 242 and 1, respectively
var = 2;
__CSIM_Store(242, 1);
Figure 6: Pre-computed
‘set’ and ‘tag’ values.
Figure 6 shows a simple
case where the address of
var is statically known, and
thus we can pre-compute its
set (242) and tag (1). These
concrete values are used to
instantiate __CSIM_Store().
Although C code is used in Figure 6, this is actually implemented
at the LLVM bitcode level inside CANAL.
Figure 7 shows a more complex case, where the array is accessed
using a variable i , and thus if-else statements are used to compute
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the set and tag of buffer[i]. Althoughwe cannot simplify as much
as in Figure 6, we can still pre-compute the value ranges of set and
tag based on the address of the array. In particular, we can assume
the value range of set is [0,3] and the tag is always 242.
4.2 Simplifying Updates of the Cache Statistics
buffer[i] = 20;
if (address_of_buffer + 4*i <
__CSIM_addr_of_cacheline01) {
__CSIM_Store(242, 0);
} else if (address_of_test + 4*i <
__CSIM_addr_of_cacheline02) {
__CSIM_Store(242, 1);
} else {
__CSIM_Store(242, 3);
}
Figure 7: Dynamically com-
puted ‘set’ and ‘tag’ values.
To simplify the storage
and update of cache sta-
tistics so verification tools
can handle them easily, we
use a set of simple vari-
ables as opposed to an ar-
ray indexed by memory
addresses. This can drasti-
cally reduce the complex-
ity of the cache-modeling
instructions inside func-
tions __CSIM_Load() and __CSIM_Store().
function __CSIM_Store(set, tag) {
if (set == 0) {
if (__CSIM_cacheline00_taken &&
__CSIM_cacheline00_tag==tag){
// cache hit
__CSIM_num_Store_hit ++;
__CSIM_Store_ret = true;
} else if (...) {
// cache hit
...
} else {
// cache miss
__CSIM_num_Store_miss ++;
__CSIM_Store_ret = false;
// pick a new line based on
the update policy
...
}
} else if (set == 1) {
...
} else if (set == 2) {
...
}
...
}
Figure 8: Code snippet of
__CSIM_Store.
Figure 8 shows the in-
ternals of __CSIM_Store(),
which updates the cache sta-
tistics based on the values
of set and tag. Instead of us-
ingmonolithic arrays such as
cacheline[set].tag, we use
individual variables such as
__CSIM_cacheline00_tag.
The number 00 means the
cache line is associated with
set 0 andway 0, and the auxil-
iary variable denotes the tag
saved at the line. When a
cache miss occurs, for exam-
ple, we update the value of
cacheline00_tag as well as
the values of similar auxil-
iary variables, and evicts a
victim. In this implementa-
tion, LRU policy is used to
compute the victim; but other replacement policies may be incor-
porated into CANAL easily.
Implementations of functions __CSIM_Store() and __CSIM_Load()
are specific to each individual program under verification, and there-
fore they are generated by CANAL automatically.
5 RELATEDWORK
CANAL is the first LLVM-based lightweight cache modeling frame-
work designed specifically for software verification tools. Although
there are other cache simulators [3, 12] and CPU simulators such
as GEM5 [9], they are not designed for this purpose. In particular,
they cannot be used in the same way as CANAL to afford existing
verification tools the capability of verifying a new class of cache
related non-functional properties.
There are also tools designed specifically for WCET analysis
based on cache analysis [5, 6, 13] and for detecting cache timing
side channels [8, 11, 15]. However, the modeling part of these tools
are tied up with the subsequent analysis part, and therefore cannot
be used by other verification tools. Furthermore, the analysis part of
these tools is rarely open-source, and often not as well-maintained
as the mainstream software verification tools, which are updated
constantly to keep up with the competition [2].
Although our main contribution in this work is the lightweight
cache modeling that facilitates the subsequent analysis and verifica-
tion, there is still room for improvement in the analysis and verifi-
cation algorithms. Since cache timing behaviors are non-functional
properties, they often have significantly different characteristics
from functional properties, and thus may benefit from specialized
algorithms to make verification more efficient and scalable.
Our implementation of CANAL has been tested on programs
from two domains: real-time software and embedded software. In
both cases, the program structure and language constructs are rel-
atively simple. To handle C/C++ programs in other application
domains, more sophisticated static analyses may be needed, e.g.,
to deal with pointer aliasing and complex loops during the pre-
computation of address-to-cache mapping and updates of the cache
statistics, in order to keep the application of our LLVM based trans-
formation efficient. We also plan to further refine our cache model,
e.g., to handle multi-threading as well as multi-level cache.
6 CONCLUSIONS
We have presented CANAL, a framework for modeling cache behav-
iors of a program based on LLVM transformations. CANAL allows
standard software verification tools to check a new class of cache
timing related properties. We have demonstrated the accuracy of
our cache model in CANAL by comparing with the simulation re-
sults of GEM5, as well as the effectiveness of combining CANAL
with three existing tools (KLEE, SMACK and Crab-llvm) in verifying
cache related properties.
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